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Summary. The opinion polls that were undertaken before the 2015 UK general election un-
derestimated the Conservative lead over Labour by an average of 7 percentage points. This
collective failure led politicians and commentators to question the validity and utility of political
polling and raised concerns regarding a broader public loss of confidence in survey research.
We assess the likely causes of the 2015 polling errors. We begin by setting out a formal ac-
count of the statistical methodology and assumptions that are required for valid estimation of
party vote shares by using quota sampling. We then describe the current approach of polling
organizations for estimating sampling variability and suggest a new method based on bootstrap
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resampling. Next, we use poll microdata to assess the plausibility of different explanations of
the polling errors. Our conclusion is that the primary cause of the polling errors in 2015 was
unrepresentative sampling.
Keywords: Election polling; Late swing; Quota sampling; Turnout weighting; Unrepresentative
samples
1. Introduction
The result of the 2015UKgeneral election cameas a shock tomost observers.During themonths
and weeks leading up to election day on May7th, the opinion polls consistently indicated that
the outcome was too close to call and the prospect of a hung Parliament therefore appeared
almost inevitable.Although therewas some variation across polling companies in their estimates
of the party vote shares, their estimates of the difference between the Conservative and Labour
Parties exceeded 2 percentage points in only 19 out of 91 polls during the short campaign from
March 30th, with 0 as the modal estimate of the Conservative lead.
The poll-induced expectation of a dead heat undoubtedly informedparty strategies andmedia
coverage during the campaign andmay ultimately have inﬂuenced the result itself, albeit in ways
that are difﬁcult to determine satisfactorily. In the event, the Conservative Party won a narrow
parliamentary majority, taking 37.7% of the popular vote in Great Britain (and 330 of the 650
seats in the House of Commons), compared with 31.2% for the Labour Party (232 seats; see
Hawkins et al. (2015) for the ofﬁcial results). The magnitude of the errors on the Conservative
lead, as well as the consistency of the error across polling companies (henceforth referred to as
‘pollsters’) strongly suggests that systematic factors, rather than sampling variability, were the
primary causes of the discrepancy.
Table 1 presents the ﬁnal published vote intention estimates for the nine pollsters that were
members of theBritishPollingCouncil (BPC) at the timeof the election, plus three non-members
who published estimates. These are estimates for Great Britain excluding Northern Ireland,
which is the usual population of inference for election polls in the UK. The estimates for the
smaller parties are close to the election result, with mean absolute errors of 0.9%, 1.4%, 1.3%
and 1.1% for the Liberal Democrats, UK Independence Party, the Green Party and other par-
ties (combined) respectively, all of which are within the pollsters’ notional margins of error for
party shares due to sampling variability (which are usually stated as ±3% for point estimates).
However, for the crucial estimate of the difference between the two main parties, 11 of the
12 Great Britain polls in Table 1 were some way from the true value, and attention has natu-
rally focused on this error. Whereas the election result saw Labour trail the Conservatives by
6.5 percentage points, ﬁve polls in the ﬁnal week reported a dead heat, three reported a 1% lead
for the Conservatives, two a 1% lead for Labour and one a 2% lead for Labour. For all nine
BPC members, the notional ±3% margin of error does not contain the true election result. Sur-
veyMonkey published the only ﬁnal poll to estimate the lead correctly, although their estimates
were too low for both the Conservatives and Labour and, indeed, had higher mean absolute
errors across all parties than the average of the other polls.
In Scotland, the three polls that were conducted in the ﬁnal week overestimated the Labour
vote share by an average of 2.4 and underestimated the Scottish National Party share by 2.7
percentage points. The average error of 5.1 percentage points on the lead of the ScottishNational
Party over Labour in Scotland was only slightly smaller than the average error on the lead of
the Conservatives over Labour in the polls for Great Britain.
These errors were not just a cause of embarrassment for the pollsters.Media sponsors publicly
questioned the quality and value of the research that they had commissioned, with at least one
national newspaper stating that it would afford less prominence to election polling in its political
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Table 1. Published estimates of voting intention for various parties (as the percentage of vote in Great
Britain), from the final polls before the UK general election on May 7th, 2015
Pollster Survey Days of Sample Results for the following parties (%):
mode ﬁeldwork size
Conservative Labour Liberal UK Green Other
Democrats Independence
Party
Populus On line May 5th–6th 3917 34 34 9 13 5 6
Ipsos- Phone May 5th–6th 1186 36 35 8 11 5 5
MORI
YouGov On line May 4th–6th 10307 34 34 10 12 4 6
ComRes Phone May 5th–6th 1007 35 34 9 12 4 6
Survation On line May 4th–6th 4088 33 34 9 16 4 4
ICM Phone May 3rd–6th 2023 34 35 9 11 4 7
Panelbase On line May 1st–6th 3019 31 33 8 16 5 7
Opinium On line May 4th–5th 2960 35 34 8 12 6 5
TNS UK On line April 30th– 1185 33 32 8 14 6 6
May 4th
Ashcroft† Phone May 5th–6th 3028 33 33 10 11 6 8
BMG† On line May 3rd–5th 1009 34 34 10 12 4 6
Survey On line April 30th– 18131 34 28 7 13 8 9
Monkey† May 6th
Election 37.7 31.2 8.1 12.9 3.8 6.4
result
Mean absolute error 3.9 2.7 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.1
†Not members of the BPC in May 2015.
coverage in the future. Politicians and peers suggested that the polling inaccuracies had affected
the outcome of the election, speculating that Labour might have done better if the polls had
been accurate. A private members’ bill was introduced in the House of Lords on May 28th,
2015, proposing state regulation of the polling industry (Regulation of Political Opinion Polling
Bill [HL] 2015-16). Concern was also expressed by social and market research industry profes-
sionals; as the most direct way that the public encounters survey and opinion research, it was
feared that the failure of the polls might have negative consequences for public conﬁdence in
social and market research and ofﬁcial statistics more generally.
It is therefore important thatweunderstandwhatwentwrongwith thegeneral electionopinion
polls in 2015, so that the risks of similar failures in the future are reduced. This is our objective
in this paper. Similar investigations have been carried out in the aftermath of previous historical
polling errors, both in theUK (Market Research Society, 1994) and in theUSA (Crossley, 1936;
Mosteller et al., 1949; Traugott et al., 2009; American Association for Public Opinion Research,
2017) and have resulted in important changes to the conduct and reporting of polls (Converse,
1987).
We draw here on the ﬁndings and conclusions that were set out in the report of the inquiry
into the failure of the polls in 2015 that was established by the BPC andMarketResearch Society
(Sturgis et al., 2016). In addition to the material that is contained in that report, we provide a
more detailed and formal account of themethodology of vote share estimation by using opinion
polls, drawing out the key assumptions on which the methodology is based and using this to
structure our presentation and interpretation of ﬁndings.We also set out a new procedure which
can be used to produce estimates of the sampling variability of opinion polls collected by using
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quota sampling, which better reﬂects their design than the (sample size invariant) ±3% rule of
thumb for the ‘margin of error’.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the methodology
of the 2015 opinion polls, the assumptions required for valid point estimation and the new
methodology that we propose for variance estimation. The data that we used to evaluate the
causes of the polling errors is described in Section 3 and the results and interpretation of our
analyses are in Section 4, where we focus on the three key potential factors: late swing, turnout
weighting and sampling. Our conclusion from these analyses is that the polling miss in 2015
occurred primarily because the procedures that were used by the pollsters to recruit respondents
produced samples which were unrepresentative of the target population’s voting intentions.
These biases were not mitigated by the statistical adjustments that pollsters applied to the raw
data. Other factors made, at most, a very modest contribution. Concluding remarks are given
in Section 5.
Data and code which are illustrative of the kinds of data that are analysed in the paper and
the program that was used to analyse them can be obtained from
http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rss-datasets
2. The methodology of pre-election polls
2.1. Point estimation of vote shares
The polls that were conducted before the 2015 general election employed one of two data
collection modes: on-line self-completion or computer-assisted telephone interviewing. For the
selection of respondents, all the polls employed non-probability (quota) rather than probability
sampling, so for estimation they cannot directly apply the well-established theory for probability
sampling (Kish, 1965; Groves et al., 2009). The operational procedures that were employed to
recruit respondents were diverse and incorporated a range of random and purposive selection
mechanisms (see Sturgis et al. (2016) for a more detailed account of these procedures). All
British pollsters, however, took a common general approach to sampling and estimation: they
assembled a quota sample of eligible individuals, calculated a weight to match the sample to
known population distributions for a set of auxiliary variables and a weight to account for
differential likelihood of voting. They then combined these two weights and produced weighted
estimates of vote intention for the population of voters from the sample data.
It is useful for our later evaluation of the potential causes of the polling errors to describe this
general approach in more formal terms. Our speciﬁcation here draws on previous treatments of
the assumptions that are required for the validity of point estimation by using quota sampling
(Smith, 1983; Deville, 1991), extended to accommodate the inclusion of turnout probabilities.
It is important to note that we do not claim that this is how the pollsters explicitly motivate
their methodology. It is, nonetheless, implicit in the procedures as they are implemented.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a set of variables which are relevant for the estimation of party vote shares for
the target population. These are all characteristics of individuals and are, in practice, treated as
categorical variables, whatever their natural metric. We denote by X auxiliary variables which
will be used to derive weights to match population distributions, and by L additional variables
which will be used to predict the probability that an individual will vote in the election. In
a typical poll, X includes characteristics such as sex, age, region and social class, as well as
measures of party identiﬁcation or vote in a previous election, whereas L is an individual’s self-
assessment of how likely he or she is to vote in the election. Further, let V denote the party that
the individual reports he or she intends to vote for (after ‘Don’t know’ answers and refusals have
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been dropped or imputed to speciﬁc parties), T an indicator of whether the individual actually
voted in the election (withT = 1 for yes andT = 0 for no),P the party (if any) that they actually
voted for and S an indicator of whether or not an individual is included in the sample (S = 1
for yes and S = 0 for no).
The target population of the poll should be such that it includes all individuals who are eligible
and registered to vote in the election (but it can also include people who are not, assuming that
they will be ﬁltered out later by being assigned turnout probabilities of 0), and that distribu-
tions of weighting variables in the population are known. In the polls that are considered here,
this population is typically that of adult residents of Great Britain (even though this has the
shortcoming that it omits voters who live abroad). Consider X partitioned as .X.1/, : : : ,X.p//,
where the subsets X.j/ are such that their distributions p.X.j// in the population are assumed
known from the census or other sources (we denote marginal and conditional distributions of
variables by p.·/ and p.·|·/). The X.j/ are typically univariate, although with some exceptions
(e.g. age distribution may be speciﬁed separately by sex).
When interviews have been completed, weights are created in such a way that the weighted
distributions of all X.j/ in the sample match their population distributions p.X.j//. This step is
similar to calibration weighting of probability samples (Deville and Sa¨rndal, 1992), so we refer
to the resulting weights as calibration weights. In the election polls that are considered below all
the weighting variables X.j/ were categorical, in which case calibration is equivalent to raking
and it can be carried out by using, for example, the iterative proportional ﬁtting algorithm
(Deming and Stephan, 1940).
By way of illustration, suppose that X consists of age by sex, X.1/, region of residence, X.2/,
and vote in the most recent previous election, X.3/, and that X.1/ and X.2/ are used also as quota
variables, with p.X.1// and p.X.2// as their target distributions. In quota sampling, the aim is
then to obtain a sample where the distribution of age by sex and the marginal distribution of
region of the sample match the target distributions, at least to a close approximation (an exact
match is often not achieved in practice). Next, a raking algorithm is applied to this sample, with
X as the weighting variables. The resulting calibration weights will be such that the weighted
distributions of age by sex, region and past vote match their population distributions p.X.1//,
p.X.2// and p.X.3// exactly.
Thegoal of a vote intentionpoll is to estimatep.V |T =1/ in thepopulation, i.e. thedistribution
of responses to the question on party choice among those members of the population who will
turn out to vote. This can be expressed as
p.V |T =1/=
∑
X,L
p.T =1|V ,L,X/p.V ,L|X/p.X/
p.T =1/ .1/
where the sum is over the possible values ofL andX. Herep.X/, p.V ,L|X/ and p.T =1|V ,L,X/
describe the population distribution of the weighting variables, distribution of voting intention
and stated likelihood to vote, and probability of turnout respectively. To estimate this quantity, a
poll draws a sample of respondents (S=1), selected through quota sampling with quota targets
deﬁned by a subset of X and elicits values of (X , L, V ) from the sampled respondents via
questionnaire. Turnout T is not known at the time of the poll, except for respondents who have
already voted by post. Letting i=1, : : : ,n index the sampled respondents, the calibrationweights
wÅi are then calculated. The distribution of .Vi,Li,Xi/ in the sample, with weights w
Å
i , is used
as an estimate of p.V ,L,X/ = p.V ,L|X/p.X/ in the population. Next, let pTi denote values
of p.Ti = 1|Vi,Li,Xi/ assigned for each respondent from an assumed model for the turnout
probabilities, and deﬁne wi =pTiwÅi . Letting I.Vi =v/ be an indicator variable for any particular
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party v which is 1 if a respondent’s stated vote intention is Vi = v and 0 otherwise, the vote
intention proportions for the parties are estimated by the weighted proportions
pˆ.V =v|T =1/=
n∑
i=1
I.Vi =v/wi
n∑
i=1
wi
: .2/
Using equation (2) to estimate p.V = v|T = 1/ implies a number of assumptions about the
quantities on the right-hand side of equation (1). First, it is assumed that the pTi assigned to
respondents are equal to the probabilities p.Ti =1|Vi,Li,Xi/ under the conditional distribution
of turnout given .V ,L,X/ in the population. Second, it is assumed that p.V ,L|X,S = 1/ =
p.V ,L|X/, i.e. that the .Vi,Li/ in the sample (unweighted, since the weights wÅi are constant
given X ) can be treated as random variables drawn from their distribution in the population, at
each level of thevariablesX whichareused toderive the calibrationweights.We refer to this as the
assumption of representative sampling. It is weaker than the requirement of representativeness
given only the quota variables, which are typically only a subset of X.
These two assumptions are still not sufﬁcient for valid estimation of p.V =1|T =1/ because
the calibration weights ensure only that the weighted distributions in the sample match the
population distributions for the marginal distributions of X.j/ but not for the joint distribution
p.X/ in equation (1). This weighted joint distribution of X in the sample matches the full p.X/
only if the sample is (fortuitously) representative in the higher order associations among the X
which have not been ﬁxed to match population totals. Alternatively, estimation with equation
(2) is also valid if the true conditional distributions of .V ,L/ and T are such that only the
p.X.j// actually contribute to probability (1). This is so, for example, if both p.T =1|V ,L,X/
and p.V ,L|X/ are linear functions of their explanatory variables and the product of these
functions does not involve any products of X.j/ and X.k/ (j = k/. This is true, for instance, in
cases where p.V ,L|X/ does not depend on interactions between the X.j/ and p.T =1|V ,L,X/=
p.T =1|V ,L/ does not depend on X.
If these assumptions hold, it is possible to estimate the distribution of stated vote intentions
V among eventual voters. What commissioners and consumers of polls really want to know,
however, is not the distribution ofV but the distribution of actual votes in the election, whichwe
denote by P. A pre-election poll cannot, however, provide direct information about P because
P does not exist (except for postal voters) until election day. To interpret the poll estimates by
using equation (2) as actual vote shares, it must also be assumed that p.V |T =1/=p.P |T =1/.
This will be true if Vi =Pi for every individual, but also if individual level changes between Vi
and Pi are self-cancelling in the aggregate.
In summary, the key assumptions which underlie the estimates of pre-election polls as they
were conducted for the 2015 UK general election are as follows.
Assumption 1 (representative sampling). Given any value of the weighting variablesX , obser-
vations .Vi,Li/ in the poll can be treated as a random sample (with equal inclusion probabilities)
from p.V ,L|X/ in the population.
Assumption 2 (correct model for turnout probabilities). The assigned turnout weights pTi are
equal to the probabilities p.Ti =1|Vi,Li,Xi/ from the conditional distribution of T which holds
in the population.
Assumption3 (agreementbetweenstatedvote intentionandactualvote). p.V |T =1/=p.P |T =
1/, i.e. there is nodifferencebetween the statedvote intention in theﬁnal poll and the choice that is
made in the election, orwhere suchdiscrepancies do exist they are self-cancelling in the aggregate.
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These are made together with the additional conditions on the distributions of X , (V , L)
and T that were discussed above. If assumptions 1 and 2 hold, equation (2) provides consistent
estimates of the vote intentions p.V |T =1/ and, if assumption 3 holds as well, of the actual vote
shares p.P |T =1/. It is unlikely in practice that these assumptions will be exactly satisﬁed, so it
is better to regard them as ideal conditions that the polls should aim to be as close to as possible
to produce reasonable estimates.
These assumptions are stringent. Assumption 1 requires that the samples are representative
given the weighting variables, even though in quota sampling the sampling probabilities are not
known and will probably be 0 for some members of the population, and robust population data
for weighting is limited. Assumption 1 will be violated if, over hypothetical repetitions of the
sampling process, the distribution of vote intention, given the weighting variables, is different
from the corresponding population distribution. For instance, in the example thatwe introduced
earlier this would occur if, for some combinations of the weighting variables age-by-sex, region
and past vote, the respondents are more educated than the target population, and education
is associated with vote even given the weighting variables. Assumption 2 requires that turnout
probabilities can bemodelled to a high degree of accuracy, even though there is little evidence on
which to base such a prediction. Assumption 3 requires that respondents’ reported pre-election
vote intentions accurately represent their actual votes, so this can fail if there are missing data
or measurement error in the stated vote intention, or if reported vote intentions change between
the poll and the election. All of these conditions are prone to violation at any given election
and may fail in ways that cause large errors in estimated vote shares. In Section 4 we examine
evidence of such failures in the 2015 polls for each of the assumptions.
2.2. Sampling variability of point estimates
We concluded from Table 1 that the 2015 polling miss was not due to random sampling error.
However, this conclusion is based on the rather unsatisfactory notion of a±3% ‘margin of error’
applied to any point estimate for a proportion, which is currently used by UK pollsters. This
rule of thumb is derived under an ‘as if ’ assumption of simple random sampling for a sample
of size of 1000, which is a common sample size for opinion polls. This heuristic is clearly not
appropriate for the sample designs of the 2015 polls. Yet, ignoring their sampling variability is
clearly unsatisfactory and, indeed, the recentAmericanAssociation forPublicOpinionResearch
task force on non-probability sampling recommended that ‘: : : users of non-probability samples
should be encouraged to report measures of the precision of their estimates’ (Baker et al., 2013).
Here, we propose a method of calculating the precision of poll estimates from quota samples,
which better reﬂects the nature of the sampling and estimation procedures in the election polls.
We propose a bootstrap resampling method which involves the following three steps:
(a) draw M independent samples by sampling respondents from the full achieved sample,
with replacement and in a way which matches the quota sampling design;
(b) for each sample thus drawn, calculate the point estimates of interest in the same way as
for the original sample, including calibration and turnout weighting;
(c) use the distribution of the estimates from the M resamples to quantify the uncertainty in
the poll estimates.
This draws on the basic ideas of bootstrap estimation in general (Davison and Hinkley, 1997)
and for probability samples in particular (Wolter, 2007). It is worth emphasizing that a key
part of the procedure is that the calibration weights are calculated afresh for each bootstrap
sample in step (b) (Rust and Rao, 1996). For non-probability samples, a comparable approach
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has been proposed by de Munnik et al. (2013), although they used it to assess the quality of a
sampling design by resampling from a simulated population, rather than the sample itself. An
alternative approach to estimating uncertainty would be to adapt variance formulae that are
used with probability sampling under approximate assumptions about the nature of the quota
samples (Deville, 1991;Rivers, 2013). It would bemore difﬁcult using this approach, however, to
accommodate speciﬁc features of the poll estimation, such as calibration and turnout weighting,
which are easily accounted for in the bootstrap method.
The intuitive idea of the bootstrap method is that the samples from step (a) are used to
represent the variation from one sample to the next that would be observed if the quota sam-
pling procedure were implemented repeatedly. Applying the estimation procedure to each of the
bootstrap samples then represents the sample-to-sample variation in the resulting estimates. It
is important to note that bootstrapping thus produces an estimate of sampling variance and not
of the variability of estimates around their true values (i.e. mean-squared errors), unless the as-
sumptions that were stated in Section 2.1 are satisﬁed and the estimates are thus approximately
unbiased.
A challenge for the resampling step (a) is that the sampling quotas do not deﬁne a partitioning
of the population, so the resample cannot be implemented within the quota as if they were sam-
pling strata. Instead, the quota form a set of separate targets for different variables, all of which
should have been reached when the sampling has been completed. To implement the resampling
in this situation, the analyst would ideally know the exact procedures through which the quota
sampling was implemented, but these speciﬁc details are not available to us. In our calculations
for the 2015 polls, we have therefore used the following algorithm which represents the generic
features of quota sampling. First, we set the quota targets to be the realized sample distributions
of the quota variables that were used by a given pollster. In the ﬁrst iteration of the resampling,
the pool of potential respondents is the full observed sample, fromwhichwe drawa sample of the
same size as the full sample, but with replacement. We then drop from this ﬁrst iteration sample
any observations which overﬁll a quota category, and we retain the rest. For the next iteration
of the sampling, the pool of potential respondents now consists only of those who are in quota
categories which remain to be ﬁlled. The sample size of the second iteration is now the number
of observations that need to be added to reach the original sample size. In other words, at each
iteration the retained sample is ‘topped up’ through a resample drawn from the quota categories
which are not yet full. Additional iterations continue until all the quotas are full, or until there
are no respondents in the original sample who belong to all the incomplete quota categories at
once. In the latter case we could run the algorithm again, or use the sample that is obtained at
this point, even though it is slightly smaller than the observed sample. For the estimates that are
presented here, we used the latter strategy.Amore detailed statement of the algorithm, computer
code and an example are included in the on-line supplementary materials to this paper.
Results from the bootstrap estimation of sampling variability in the ﬁnal polls are presented in
Table 2, based on 10000 bootstrap samples. It shows point estimates and 95% interval estimates
of the Conservative–Labour difference in vote shares. These are adjusted percentile intervals
(Davison and Hinkley, 1997), although standard percentile intervals and symmetric normal
intervals give similar results. None of the intervals in Table 2 includes the election result of a
6.5-point Conservative lead. We can therefore be conﬁdent in our initial conclusion that the
polling miss was not due to sampling variability.
Table 2 also showsbootstrap standard errors of the estimated vote shares for theConservatives
and for Labour. We can compare these with the notional ‘margin of error’ that is obtained if the
poll sample is treated as a simple random sample, where the sampling variance for an estimated
vote share p from a sample of size n is given by p.100−p/=n. Table 2 shows estimated design
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Table 2. Measures of uncertainty in estimates of voting intention from the final polls: point estimates and
95% interval estimates for the Conservative–Labour difference, and standard errors se and estimated design
effects d2 for the Conservative and Labour vote shares†
Pollster Survey mode Conservative−Labour (%) Conservative (%) Labour (%) n
(election result, 6.5%)
se d2 se d2
Estimate 95% interval‡
Populus On line −0:1 .−2:5; 2:0/ 0.7 0.82 0.7 0.73 3695
Ipsos-MORI Phone −0:3 .−6:6; 6:1/ 1.8 1.37 1.9 1.40 928
YouGov On line 0.4 .−1:1; 1:8/ 0.4 0.76 0.4 0.76 9064
ComRes Phone 0.8 .−4:6; 6:3/ 1.5 0.86 1.9 1.30 852
Survation On line 0.1 .−2:2; 2:5/ 0.7 0.79 0.7 0.85 3412
ICM Phone 0.0 .−2:8; 3:1/ 0.9 0.53 1.0 0.68 1681
Panelbase On line −2:7 .−5:6; 0:2/ 0.9 1.17 0.9 1.16 3019
Opinium On line 0.4 .−1:8; 2:5/ 0.6 0.42 0.7 0.47 2498
TNS UK On line 0.8 .−3:6; 5:2/ 1.4 0.79 1.3 0.72 889
†The interval estimates and standard errors have been calculated from the microdata provided by the pollsters,
using bootstrap resampling with 10000 bootstrap samples. Some of these replicated estimates differ slightly from
the published results in Table 1, mainly because of rounding and differences in algorithms used for calibration
weighting. n, number of respondents who gave a voting intention for a party. d2 = se2={p.1−p/=n} where p is
the estimated vote share.
‡Adjusted percentile interval.
effects d2 for the vote shares, calculated by dividing the bootstrap variance by the variance under
simple random sampling, with p as the estimated share and n the number of respondents who
gave a vote intention (this n ignores the variability in the turnout probabilities and so probably
underestimates the design effect). Most of the design effects are less than 1, indicating that the
sampling variability is smaller than would be expected under simple random sampling. When
this is so, the conventional margins of error somewhat overestimate the sampling variability
in the poll estimates. The increased efﬁciency of the estimates is mainly due to calibration on
variables measuring party afﬁliation or past voting, which are strongly correlated with current
vote intention (all pollsters except Ipsos-MORI used this type of variable in their calibration
weighting). If these variables are omitted from the quotas and weighting, all design effects in
Table 2 are greater than 1, with values between 1.04 and 1.68.
3. Data
Our main evidence for assessing the source of the polling errors in 2015 is data from the polls
themselves. Each of the nine BPC members provided respondent level microdata, together
with documentation on their methodology, including ﬁeldwork procedures, quota targets and
weighting. These datawere provided for the ﬁrst, penultimate andﬁnal polls thatwere conducted
during the short campaign but almost all of the analyses reported in this paper use the ﬁnal
polls (i.e. the nine polls that were conducted by the BPC members in Table 1). The six pollsters
who carried out surveys where respondents were recontacted after the election also provided
these data sets (these are discussed in Section 4.2). We could replicate all published estimates
for these 27 pre-election polls, enabling us to exclude the possibility that ﬂawed analysis or use
of inaccurate weighting targets contributed to the polling miss.
We also analysed data from the 2015 rounds of the British Election Study (BES) and the
British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey to benchmark the poll estimates against surveys which
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use random-probability sample designs. The methodology of these surveys is described in detail
elsewhere (Fieldhouse et al., 2015; Clery et al., 2016), but, in brief (and for both surveys), a
multistage, stratiﬁed probability sample of addresses is drawn from the Post Ofﬁce Address File
and an interview is attempted with a randomly selected eligible adult at each eligible address.
Multiple calls aremade to each selected address at different times of day and on different days of
the week to achieve an interview. Substitutions for sampled respondents who were not reached
or who declined to be interviewed are not permitted. Interviews are carried out face to face by
trained interviewers via questionnaires loaded onto laptop computers. TheBES andBSA survey
attained response rates of 56% and 51% (American Association for Public Opinion Research
response rate 1) respectively, which, though not especially high in historical terms, are good by
contemporary standards. The interviews were carried out after the election, in May–October
2015.
4. Assessment of potential causes of the polling errors
In this section we assess the evidence in support of the different potential causes of the errors
in the 2015 polls. The discussion is structured around the three core assumptions that were set
out in Section 2, with assumption 3 considered in Section 4.1, turnout weighting (assumption
2) in Section 4.2, and representative sampling (assumption 1) in Section 4.3.
In the polling inquiry report, the following more minor factors were also considered and
dismissed as contributory causes of the polling errors: treatment of postal voters, overseas
voters, voter registration, question wording and order, and mode of interview. Although we do
not consider these factors directly in this paper, each can be understood as violations of the
three key assumptions that are covered in the following sections. For instance, errors due to
omission of overseas and postal voters would be violations of assumption 1 on representative
sampling. Errors due to question wording or measurement mode would fall under violation of
assumption 3, which stated that vote intention is equal to the actual vote. Likewise, unregistered
voters would be a particular violation of assumption 2, that the turnout probabilities are correct.
More detail on the speciﬁc reasons for ruling out these factors is provided in Sturgis et al. (2016).
Nor do we discuss here the phenomenon of ‘herding’, which is when there is more consensus
across poll estimates than would be expected under random sampling because it relates to the
variability of estimates across polls, rather than to bias in poll estimates (Sturgis et al., 2016).
4.1. Differences between reported vote intention and actual vote (‘late swing’)
Some voters agree to take part in opinion polls but do not disclose the party that they intend
to vote for. Others do not know whom they will support, or they deliberately misreport their
vote intention or report their intention truthfully but then change their minds after the poll. If a
sufﬁcient number of these types of voters move disproportionately to different parties between
the polls and election day, vote shares that are estimated from the polls will differ from the
election result. This discrepancy will not be due to inaccuracy of the polls as estimates of the
stated vote intentions, but to inadequacy of the assumption (assumption 3) that the stated
intentions V can be treated as a measure of the actual vote P. Following the convention in
the polling literature, we refer to a difference between V and P as late swing. The term refers
most naturally to a switching from one party to another, but we also include movement from
non-substantive responses (‘don’t knows’ and refusals) to a party choice.
Reports into the polling failures at the 1970 (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, 1971) and 1992
(Market Research Society, 1994) elections both attributed a prominent role to late swing. This
Causes of Errors in Election Opinion Polls 767
Table 3. Conservative lead over Labour (for Great Britain), estimated from five post-election
recontact surveys and (for the same respondents, those who reported that they had voted) from
polls before the election†
Results for the following pollsters (%):
TNS Populus ICM Survation YouGov Combined‡
Before election −2:1 −1:3 0.0 0.3 0.5 −0:2
After election 1.9 −0:4 1.9 3.8 −0:8 0.4
Difference 4.0 0.9 1.8 3.4 −1:3 0.6
95% interval§ .−0:5; 8:5/ .−0:6; 2:4/ .−0:9; 4:6/ (0.2; 6.6) .−2:3;−0:3/ .−0:2; 1:5/
Sample size 1477 3036 2480 1525 6712 15230
†The election result was a 6.5% Conservative lead.
‡Weighted average of the estimates for the pollsters, weighted by the sample sizes.
§Symmetric 95% conﬁdence intervals, using standard errors estimated from 10000 bootstrap resamples
for each pollster.
was particularly so for the 1970 report, which concluded that late swing was almost entirely
to blame for the failure to predict the Conservative victory in that election. It has also been
identiﬁed as a contributory factor for polling misses in the USA (American Association for
Public Opinion Research, 2009; Keeter et al., 2016). There are, therefore, good prima facie
grounds for assuming that late swing may have contributed to the polling miss in 2015.
The most direct way of assessing late swing is to examine data from recontact surveys, where
the same respondents have been interviewed both before and after the election. Six pollsters
carried out such surveys, although one proved to be unusable for our purposes because ﬁeldwork
outcomes did not distinguish between refusals and non-voters. For the analysis of late swing
we use only the samples of voters who reported after the election that they had voted, which
means that turnout weights are not needed and that assumption 2 is not required. Because not
all respondents that were recontacted provided an interview, the estimates are weighted by the
product of the pre-election calibration weight and an attrition weight. The attrition weight was
calculated as the inverse of the predicted probability of responding to the recontact survey,
derived from a logistic regression model where the predictor variables were all the variables that
were used for weighting in the ﬁnal poll, plus the question on likelihood to vote if used for the
poll. For two pollsters the sample sizes for the recontact surveys were very small but in these
cases it was possible to include respondents who were interviewed in earlier polls for the same
company during the short campaign.
Table 3 shows point estimates of the Conservative lead over Labour for these ﬁve samples,
from the pre-election polls and the recontact surveys. In four of the ﬁve polls the post-election
estimatesmove in thedirectionof a larger lead for theConservatives, and inonepoll (thepollwith
the largest sample size) in the opposite direction. The average change towards the Conservatives
weighting all ﬁve polls equally is 1.8 points and −0:4 points if only respondents from the ﬁnal
polls are included. An average of the ﬁve estimates (for all respondents) weighted by sample
size is 0.6 points, with a 95% conﬁdence interval (obtained by using bootstrap estimates of the
standard errors of the estimates) is from −0:2% to 1.6%. Regardless of which of these estimates
one prefers, none of them is nearly enough to explain the total error in the polls.
Some part of these changes may be due to measurement effects in the pre-election responses
such as the treatment of refusals and ‘don’t know’ responses. Pollsters used different combina-
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tions of ‘squeeze’ questions (where initially non-disclosing respondents are pushed to provide a
vote intention) and imputation to allocate vote intentions for these respondents. However, the
aggregate effects of these procedures on the ﬁnal vote intention estimates were small (Sturgis
et al., 2016).
A frequently advanced explanation of polling errors that is by media commentators is delib-
erate misreporting, which is when respondents knowingly tell pollsters that they will vote for a
particular party when they actually intend to vote for a different party. This is generally consid-
ered to occur, not out of capriciousness or spite against pollsters, but because of processes of
social desirability. For example, in the UK, deliberate misreporting has been invoked to explain
the tendency of polls to underestimate the Conservative vote as a result of respondents being
unwilling to admit to voting Conservative—so-called ‘shy Tories’. But the same phenomenon
could apply to any party that voters feel embarrassed to admit to supporting because there is
some sort of social stigma associated with it.
A response pattern of deliberate misreporting of voting intention is indistinguishable from
late swing; the individual tells the pollster that they will vote for party A but subsequently votes
for party B. Whether their initial report was a deliberate misreport is neither here nor there with
regard to the pattern of response that is observed. Our conclusions about late swing therefore
also enable us to rule out deliberate misreporting as a cause of the polling miss. A limitation
to this conclusion is that actual vote could also be deliberately misreported in the recontact
surveys, i.e. respondents could lie both before and after the election. It is very difﬁcult to rule
out this possibility deﬁnitively, but indirect evidence suggests that it is unlikely. In particular,
the two post-election random-probability surveys—the BES and the BSA survey—produced
estimates of the election result that were approximately correct (as discussed in Section 4.3),
with both producing estimates of the Conservative vote share that were actually slightly above
the result. We see no reason to assume that respondents should choose deliberately to misreport
their past vote in some post-election surveys but not in others. In summary then, we rule out
violations of assumption 3 such as late swing and deliberate misreporting, as having made any
notable contribution to the polling miss.
4.2. Turnout weighting
The pollsters used a range of methods for constructing turnout weights pTi . Most relied on
responses to a self-reported likelihood-to-vote (LTV) question such as ‘how likely is it that you
will vote in the general election on 7th May?’, to which responses were recorded on scales of
between four and 11 points. Some pollsters used the question as a binary ﬁlter (so that those
belowa threshold on theLTVquestion received a turnoutweight of 0 and those above aweight of
1) and others in a smoother manner (e.g. by dividing a 0–10 LTV response by 10). Some turnout
weights were based only on an LTV question, whereas others used additional information such
as age or past voting. The models that were used to generate the turnout weights were educated
guesses, with the exception of TNS UK who used a model that was ﬁtted to data from the 2010
BES (which includes both an LTV question and a measure of validated vote).
Recall that assumption 2 requires that probabilities of voting in the election are allocated
to the respondents on the basis of an accurate model for turnout, conditional on self-assessed
likelihood of voting, L, voting intention V and auxiliary variables X. Speciﬁcally, the weights
should accurately describe these probabilities in the population of voters. This presents a prob-
lem for assessing the adequacy of the turnout model, because this should ideally be done by
using a high quality pre-election probability sample in which LTV, intended vote and turnout
after the election are observed. Unfortunately, no such study was undertaken in 2015. What
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Fig. 1. Probability of turnout, estimated from five recontact surveys, as a smoothed function of turnout
weights for the same respondents obtained from pre-election polls ( ), with 95% confidence bands ( )
(the bar charts at the bottom of each plot show the relative frequencies of the values of the turnout weights):
(a) ICM; (b) Populus; (c) Survation; (d) TNS UK; (e) YouGov
can be examined, though, is how well pTi approximated p.T =1|V ,L,X,S =1/, i.e. the turnout
probabilities in the poll samples. This is not conclusive evidence to make this assessment, be-
cause it requires the additional assumption that the model for these probabilities should be
approximately the same for the poll respondents and the target population. The validity of this
assumption cannot be directly assessed.
Fig. 1 provides information about the accuracy of the turnout weights as estimates of turnout
probabilities for respondents in the ﬁve recontact surveys. The full curves show the probability
of turnout as a smoothed function of the turnout weights, so the accuracy of the weights as
probabilities of voting can be judged by the proximity of the full curves to the broken lines
(on which the reported turnout rate is equal to the actual turnout weight). For all except one
of the pollsters it is clear that actual turnout was higher, sometimes substantially higher, than
the turnout weights implied, except where the weight was close to 1 (TNS UK was a partial
exception here, producing turnout weights which were overestimates when the weight was less
than 0.5). Some, though not all, of this inaccuracy in the turnout weights may be accounted for
by overreporting of turnout in the recontact surveys.
The bar chart at the bottom of each plot in Fig. 1 shows the relative frequency of respondents
with different values of the turnout weights. It is clear that a large majority of the respondents
received a weight of 1. Almost all such respondents also reported after the election that they
had voted. Thus, although the calibration of turnout weights was poor across the full range of
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probabilities, for most of the poll respondents the weights were quite accurate because the vast
majority reported that they would vote and they were allocated a turnout probability of 1.
The accuracyof the turnoutweights are of little substantive interest in themselves. Theymatter
only in so far as they affect estimated vote shares. Whether this was so for the 2015 polls may
be assessed by calculating vote intention estimates under different speciﬁcations for the turnout
weights. First, we can use the recontact polls to examine whether the estimated shares would
have been different if turnout weights had not been needed at all, i.e. if the pollsters had known
who would and would not turn out to vote. This is done by calculating estimates by using pre-
election vote intention only for those respondents who are known (by self-report in the recontact
surveys) to have voted in the election; these respondents can be assigned a turnout probability of
1. Estimates for the difference in the Conservative–Labour vote share by using this approach are
shown in the ﬁrst row of Table 3. They are between −2:1 and 0.5 percentage points, compared
with from −2:7 to 0.7 points for the ﬁnal polls (the latter for all nine BPC members). There is,
thus, no evidence that the poll estimates would have been more accurate, even if the pollsters
had known before the election which respondents would and would not turn out to vote.
We can also examine the sensitivity of vote intention estimates by calculating the party shares
with various speciﬁcations for the turnout weights, keeping all other elements of the weighting
unchanged. An example is presented in Fig. 2, which shows estimates of the Conservative lead
for the ﬁnal polls, with four different turnout weights (from left to right):
(a) using only those respondents who said that they were certain to vote, i.e. who gave the
highest response to the LTV question;
(b) the turnout weights that were used for the published estimates;
(c) transformed weights .p+pÅ.1−p/ where p is the original turnout weight) which would
have been closer to the true turnout probabilities in Fig. 1;
(d) giving every respondent a turnout probability of 1.
These quite different speciﬁcations do not change the estimates in any substantial way. We have
also used a range of turnout weights from a model-based approach applied to the 2010 and
2015 BESs (of the kind used by TNS UK). These alternative probabilities also have no notable
effect on the vote share estimates.
It is worth noting that none of the pollsters included vote intention in their models for turnout
probability, so they implicitly assumed that the probability does not depend on the party that
the respondent intends to vote for, once LTV and other variables have been controlled. If this
assumption fails, supporters of one party would be more likely than another to vote, given their
reported pre-election LTV. We refer to this possibility, which has the potential to cause biases
in poll estimates of vote shares, as ‘differential turnout misreporting’. We can assess whether
this occurred in 2015 by including vote intention as a predictor in a model predicting turnout
probability. Using this speciﬁcation the party variable is statistically signiﬁcant for only one
pollster, and here the effect is in the opposite direction to what would be required to explain
the polling miss; those who said that they intended to vote Labour were more likely to vote,
given their answer to the LTV question. The recontact surveys therefore show no evidence of
differential turnout misreporting.
In summary, there were notable inaccuracies in the turnout weights as estimates of actual
turnout probabilities for the respondents to the 2015 election polls. However, this made little
difference to the ﬁnal vote shares; estimates of the Conservative lead would not have been more
accurate, even if the turnout weights had been based on self-reported vote after the election, or if
they had been assigned in a very different set of ways.Nor is there evidence that respondents who
reported intending to vote Labour may have overestimated their future likelihood of turnout
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Fig. 2. Conservative lead over Labour (per cent for Great Britain), estimated from the final polls by the nine
BPC members with various specifications of the turnout weights—from left to right, these specifications are
as follows: using only the respondents who said that they were certain to vote, the original (pollster-specific)
turnout weights p, weights of p C p*.1  p/ and using all respondents with weight 1, irrespective of stated
likelihood to vote ( , true election result (6.5%); , unweighted average of the figures for the nine
polls)
more than Conservative intenders. We conclude, on this basis, that violations of assumption 2
on turnout weighting were not responsible for the 2015 polling miss.
4.3. Representative sampling
We have concluded that violations of assumptions 2 and 3 relating to late swing and turnout
weighting made little or no contribution to the 2015 polling error. By a process of elimination,
then, we are led to conclude that violation of assumption 1—representative sampling—must
have been the primary locus of the 2015 polling miss: the polls systematically overrepresented
Labour voters and underrepresented Conservative voters in their weighted estimates.
In this section, we examine what direct evidence there is to support the judgement that the
polling miss was due to unrepresentative samples. We ﬁrst consider a comparison with two
surveys that were undertaken shortly after the election and which used probability sampling
designs: the BES and the BSA survey. We then examine estimates of vote shares by subgroups
deﬁned by theweighting variables, and then biases in estimates of other variableswhich are likely
to be related to voting. Although none of these lines of evidence can be considered conclusive
in themselves, collectively they provide consistent evidence to support the conclusion that the
poll samples were systematically biased in their composition relative to the target population.
The BES and BSA employ what can be considered ‘gold standard’ procedures at all stages
of their design but are most notably different from the polls in that they employ probability
sampling rather than quota sampling. It is important to be clear that probability sampling does
not on its own guarantee accuracy of survey estimates; these types of survey are themselves
subject to various errors of observation and non-observation (Groves, 1989). In particular,
when a substantial proportion of the eligible sample fails to complete the survey, either through
refusal toparticipate or failure tobe contacted, there is a risk that estimateswill bebiasedbecause
of differential non-response (although recent research has shown that the correlation between
response rate and non-response bias is considerably weaker than has historically been assumed;
see Groves and Peytcheva (2008) and Sturgis et al. (2016)). As we shall see, however, in 2015
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Fig. 3. Estimates of voting intention for the various parties (as percentages of vote in Great Britain): BES
( ), BSA survey ( ) and the average of the final polls by the nine members of the BPC ( ) ( , election
results; , 95% confidence intervals for BES and BSA survey estimates)
the BES and BSA survey were far more accurate than the pre-election polls in their estimates of
the vote distribution and, given the transparency and robustness of their underlying sampling
procedures, it is reasonable to use them as a lens through which to assess the quality of the poll
samples which were obtained by using quite different approaches.
The reported vote distributions for the BES and BSA survey are shown in Fig. 3, alongside
the average vote intention estimates for the ﬁnal polls and the election result. It is immediately
apparent that the BES and BSA survey produced more accurate estimates of the Conservative
lead over Labour than the polls, with the BES showing a 7-point lead and the BSA survey a
6-point lead for the Conservatives. Neither of these surveys was itself completely accurate, with
both signiﬁcantly underestimating the UK Independence Party share, the BES overestimating
the Conservative share and the BSA survey overestimating the Labour share.
This comparison is suggestive that the polls underestimated the Conservative lead as a re-
sult of their sampling procedures. However, it is inconclusive on this point because the BES
and BSA survey differ from the polls in other respects, beyond their sample designs. Most
importantly, both were undertaken after the election had taken place. This means that there
was no uncertainty (at least by self-report) about whether the respondents had voted or not
when they reported their vote choice, whereas the polls had to factor in whether a respondent
would actually vote or not to their pre-election estimates. The reported votes of the BES or
BSA survey respondents might also have been inﬂuenced by their knowledge of the election
result, which could not have been so for the pre-election polls. Previous research has shown a
tendency for respondents to recall disproportionately having voted for the winning party—so
called ‘bandwagoning’ (Nadeau et al., 1993) and such effects might plausibly have contributed
to the difference in the lead estimates between the surveys and the polls in 2015 (we note that
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this might also have affected the recontact polls that were discussed in Section 4.1, in which case
bandwagoningwould have exaggerated the before–after differences that are reported in Table 3).
Another potentially consequential difference is the mode of interview, with the BES and
BSA survey using face-to-face interviews and the polls using either telephone interviews or
on-line self-completion. Although face-to-face interviewing is generally acknowledged to be the
gold standard for survey modes (Couper, 2011), this does not imply that it will produce more
accurate self-reports of vote choice than the other modes. Indeed, the survey methodological
literature suggests that the face-to-face interviewing is more prone to measurement error due
to socially desirable responding than telephone and self-completion modes (Tourangeau et al.,
2000). Nonetheless, these factors all render the headline comparison between the polls and BES
and BSA survey ambiguous with regard to the underlying cause of the difference.
Fortunately, we can effectively rule out the two most important of these design differences
by considering the reported vote distributions for the polls that undertook recontact surveys.
Because the recontact surveys were carried out after the election, we can exclude timing rela-
tive to the election as a potential confounder. Table 3 shows that there is only a very modest
improvement in poll estimates (weighted for attrition) of the Conservative lead when the polls
are undertaken after the election and respondents are reporting their actual, rather than their
intended, vote. These comparisons, then, support the conclusion that the differences between
the BES and BSA survey and the polls were due to differences in their sampling procedures,
rather than to whether they were undertaken before or after the election. A caveat to this con-
clusion is that the ﬁeldwork periods were much shorter for the recontact polls than for the BES
and BSA survey, so bandwagoning may have been more prevalent in the latter than the former
case. However, Mellon and Prosser (2017) demonstrate that this possibility has little empirical
support, for the BES at least.
Recall that assumption 1 for representative sampling requires that, for any given value of the
weighting variables X , observations .Vi,Li/ in a poll are a random sample from p.V ,L|X/ in
the population. It is informative, therefore, to assess the extent to which the polls were in error
not only in the aggregate but also across the weighting cells that were used by the pollsters. Fig.
4 presents estimates of the Conservative–Labour difference by exemplar weighting variables,
compared with the actual election result (for region) or with estimates from the BES and BSA
survey (combined where both are available, because of small sample sizes by weighting cells
for each survey on its own). It can be seen that there is no apparent difference in the polling
error between men and women. When considered by age band, however, the polls substantially
underestimate the Conservative lead among those aged 45–64 years and, to a lesser extent, those
aged 55–64 years. Here, of course, we must assume that the BES or BSA survey distribution
is approximately correct within age bands, although this does not seem unreasonable given
that both surveys calculated the population estimate of the Conservative lead approximately
correctly.
Considered by self-reported vote in the 2010 general election, the pattern in Fig. 4 suggests
that the polls weremost inaccurate for those who voted for the twomain parties in 2010. Finally,
at the government ofﬁce region level the results suggest that the polls particularly underestimated
the Conservative lead in regions where the Conservative vote share was higher than the national
average; the East, East Midlands, South West and South East. In sum, these analyses clearly
demonstrate that the key assumption of representativeness of vote intention within weighting
cells was strongly and consistently violated in the 2015 polls. The pattern that we observe in these
charts also suggests a systematic tendency for the polls to underestimate Conservative support
in subgroups where the Conservative lead over Labour is highest, e.g. older people, southern
counties and people who voted Conservative in 2010. We cannot pursue this further empirically
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given the data that were available to us, but it seems likely that a key reason that the polls
underestimated the Conservative lead over Labour is that their sampling procedures system-
atically under-represented Conservative voters within these kinds of Conservative supporting
demographic groups.
A third type of comparison is informative about the representativeness of the poll samples;
how accurate the poll estimates are for other variables that weremeasured in the polls and which
are themselves related to vote choice. Consider, for example, sector of employment; it is known
that, broadly, public sector workers are more likely to vote Labour and private sector workers
are more likely to vote Conservative (Dunleavy, 1980). If polls that do not weight to population
totals for employment sector were found to have overestimated the proportion of voters who
work in the public sector, then this would not only constitute evidence that the poll samples
were unrepresentative with regard to employment sector; it would also suggest a potential cause
of the bias in the vote choice estimate. That is to say, by over-representing public sector workers
in their samples, the polls would have overestimated support for Labour and underestimated
support for the Conservatives. This approach is appealing because it indicates ways in which
poll samples might be improved in the future, either through changes to sample recruitment
procedures or through improvements to quota and weighting targets (see for example Mellon
and Prosser (2017) and Rivers and Wells (2015)).
Unfortunately, the extent to which we can implement this strategy is constrained by the
paucity of candidate variables in the poll samples for which gold standard estimates are also
available. Variables which meet these twin criteria are, almost by deﬁnition, scarce. If they
had been collected, the pollsters would probably already be using them in their sampling and
weighting procedures. Nonetheless, some variables are available which enable us to consider the
polls from this perspective, albeit in a more limited manner than we would ideally like.
The ﬁrst example relates to the continuous age distribution within banded age ranges. All
pollsters weight their raw sample data to match the distribution of age by banded ranges in the
population census. Three of the BPCmembers also recorded continuous age, making it possible
for us to assess the age distribution within age bands and to compare this with the distribution
from the census and the BES or BSA survey (the three BPCmember polls were all conducted on
line, so we cannot conclude that the same effect is apparent in phone samples). Fig. 5 displays
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this comparison for the oldest age band: those aged 65 years and older. It shows that the polls
substantially over-represent people under the age of 70 years and under-represent those aged
75 years and older within this age band, whereas the BES and BSA survey do not. Indeed,
the three polls that are included here contain almost no respondents aged 90 years or above.
It is easy to see how this kind of imbalance could arise in the quota sampling that is used for
the polls, where the oldest age group for the quota targets was typically 65 years and older.
If individuals towards the younger end of this age band were easier to include in the poll, the
‘oldest old’ would end up being under-represented in the sample.
This is itself direct evidence that poll samples can produce quite biased estimates of population
characteristics. However, it also indicates the kinds of selectionmechanismwhichmight, in part,
have led to the 2015 polling miss. If the Conservative lead over Labour was bigger among voters
aged over 74 years than those aged between 65 and 74 years, then under-representing the older
age group would have biased the estimate of the Conservative lead towards 0. In fact, the 2015
BES shows that the Conservatives held a 21-point lead over Labour among those aged over
74 years anda22-point lead among those aged64–74years. So theunder-representationof voters
aged 75 years and over in the poll samples seems unlikely to have made a notable contribution
to the 2015 polling miss.
A second example of biased estimates in the poll samples relates to reported turnout in the
2010 general election. Fig. 6 plots self-reported 2010 turnout by age band for the 2015 polls and
for the BES.With one exception, the polls consistently overestimate turnout in the 2010 election
(even compared with the BES, where turnout may also be over-reported), with a particularly
large bias among those aged 18–24 years. Given that only around a third of this cohort would
even have been eligible to vote in 2010, these are very substantial overestimates of the true
proportion. A similar pattern has been observed in pre-election polls for other indicators of
political engagement (Rivers and Wells, 2015; Mellon and Prosser, 2017).
In Section 2 we identiﬁed assumption 1 of representative sampling to be particularly strong.
In this section we have assessed the empirical evidence that this assumption was violated in
the 2015 polls. We have shown that estimates from surveys using random-probability sampling
produced accurate estimates of the Conservative lead over Labour (and that this difference
cannot be attributed to their having been undertaken after the election), that the polls exhibited
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substantial biases within weighting cells and that biases were evident on other variables in
addition to vote intention. Individually and collectively these ﬁndings support the conclusion
that unrepresentativeness of the poll samples on vote intention was the key contributory factor
in the 2015 polling miss.
5. Discussion
In the months and weeks leading up to the 2015 general election the polls told a consistent
story: the Conservatives and Labour were in a dead heat in the popular vote. This led media
commentators, party strategists and the public to focus attention on the likely composition of
a coalition, rather than on a single-party government led by the Conservatives who, of course,
ultimately won the election with a 6.5% lead over Labour and an absolute majority in the House
of Commons. The expectation of a hung Parliament in the ﬁnal days and weeks of the campaign
was so strong and widely held that the sense of shock and disbelief was palpable when the result
of the exit poll was announced at 10 p.m. on May 7th.
Having considered a range of plausible contributory factors and sources of data, our analyses
lead us to conclude that the primary cause of the polling miss was that the samples were unrep-
resentative of the population of voters. In short, the methods that were used to collect samples
of voters systematically over-represented Labour supporters and under-represented Conserva-
tive supporters. The statistical adjustment procedures that were applied to the raw data did not
mitigate this basic problem to any notable degree.
We came to this conclusion partly by elimination of other putative causes of the error. The
discrepancy between the point estimates of the Conservative lead in the polls and the election
result cannot be attributed to sampling error.Using a newprocedure for calculating the precision
of vote share estimates from quota samples, we have shown that none of the BPC pollsters’
estimates contained the true lead of the Conservatives over Labour within the 95% conﬁdence
interval. We recommend that pollsters move to adoption of this, or a similar, approach to
estimating the sampling variance of party vote shares. We could also replicate all published
estimates for the ﬁrst, the penultimate and the ﬁnal published polls by using the raw microdata
provided by the BPC pollsters, enabling us to rule out the possibility that some of the errors
were due to ﬂawed analysis or use of inaccurate weighting targets.
We found some evidence that there may have been a modest shift in vote share towards the
Conservatives between the ﬁnal polls and election day, although this can have contributed at
most around one and a half percentage points to the mean error on the Conservative lead. The
widely held view that the polling miss was due to deliberate misreporting—‘shy Tories’ telling
pollsters that they intended to vote for other parties—is very difﬁcult to reconcile with the results
of the recontact surveys that were carried out by the pollsters and with the BES and BSA survey
undertaken after the election by using random-probability sample designs. Ruling out this kind
of shift also enables us to discount measurement error arising from question wording and order
as a possible cause, because this is a special case of the same overarching phenomenon.
Differential turnout was also pointed to after the election as a likely cause of the errors;
so-called ‘lazy Labour’ supporters telling pollsters that they would vote Labour but ultimately
not turning out to vote. Data from various sources show no support for differential turnout
misreporting, or errors in predicted probabilities of turnout in general, making anything except
a very small contribution to the polling errors. This means that we can also reject the possibility
that unregistered votersmade any contribution to the polling errors because this wouldmanifest
as an error of turnout weighting.
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If the potential causes that were considered above are found to have made, at best, marginal
contributions to thepolling error,weare left to conclude thatunrepresentativeness in the samples
must havebeen theprimary cause of the pollingmiss in 2015.On its own, a strategywhich reaches
a conclusion through elimination of alternative explanations is not very satisfactory, particularly
when the evidence on which the preliminary eliminations are based is imperfect, as here. If we
had been drawn, by a process of elimination, to conclude that the polling miss was due to a
prima facie implausible explanatory factor—such as overseas voters—then we would question
the validity of the process that led us to this inference. But this is not so here; we identiﬁed
sampling and weighting procedures as representing inherent weaknesses in our description of
the assumptions underlying the methodology of polling.
We have also provided empirical evidence in support of the conclusion that the sampling
procedures that were employed by the pollsters produced biased estimates of vote intentions.
Random-probability samples undertaken shortly after the election produced accurate estimates
of the Conservative lead over Labour, suggesting that the less robust sampling procedures that
were used by the polls were responsible for the underestimation of this key parameter. The
difference in the estimate of the Conservative lead between the probability samples and the
polls is still evident by using the recontact surveys that were undertaken by a subset of pollsters,
indicating that the sampling procedures rather than the timing of the ﬁeldwork were the cause of
thedifference in the estimates of the lead.Additionally,we showed that thepolls strongly violated
the core assumption that is required for representative sampling; that the estimates of vote
intention should be accurate conditional on the variables that are used for calibrationweighting.
It was particularly suggestive that the polls underestimated the Conservative lead most in areas
and subgroups where the true Conservative lead was largest. Finally, we presented speciﬁc
examples of two other variables in the poll samples, age and turnout in the 2010 election, on
which biases were also evident. Taken together, these ﬁndings lead us to conclude that violation
of the representative sampling assumption was the primary cause of the 2015 polling miss.
What can be done to improve the representativeness of poll samples in the future? The answer
to this question depends on whether the pollsters continue to employ quota methods, or switch
to random-probability sampling. Because of the high cost of probability sampling, we expect
the vast majority of opinion polls to continue to use non-random sampling methods for the
foreseeable future. The aim then must be to do them as well as possible: a point that is not
limited to election polls but refers to the increasing volume of research being undertaken using
on-line non-probability samples (for an introduction to the growth of non-probability sampling,
see the American Association for Public Opinion Research report by Baker et al. (2013), and
its references and associated discussion).
Continuing with non-random sampling in the election polls means that there are only two
broad strategies that can be pursued to improve sample representativeness. Pollsters can take
measures to increase the representativeness of respondents who were recruited to existing quota
and weighting cells, or they can incorporate new variables in their weighting schemes which are
related to both the probability of selecting into poll samples and vote intention. These are not
mutually exclusive strategies.
How this is done will depend, to an extent, on the mode of interview of the poll. For phone
polls this is likely to involve (but will not be limited to) using longer ﬁeldwork periods, more
call-backs to initially non-responding numbers (both non-contacts and refusals) and ensuring a
more representativemix of landline andmobile phone numbers.We recognize that, taken to their
logical extreme, these procedures would be practically equivalent to implementing a random-
probability design and would therefore be expensive and time consuming. Although, as we shall
note shortly, wewould verymuchwelcome the implementation of truly random-sample designs,
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we acknowledge that the cost restrictions of true random methods make them impractical for
the vast majority of pre-election phone polls. The extended ﬁeldwork periods that are required
for high quality random samples also means that they have obvious weaknesses for campaigns
characterized by volatile voter preferences. Nevertheless, it would seem that there are gains to
be made in quality without making the resultant design unaffordably expensive and lengthy. It
may be that implementing procedures of this nature results in fewer polls being carried out than
in the last Parliament, as the cost of undertaking each would no doubt increase. This would,
in our view, be no bad thing, so long as the cost savings that accrue from doing fewer polls are
invested in quality improvements.
For on-line polls the procedures that are required to yield more representative samples within
weighting cells are also likely to involve longer ﬁeld periods and more reminders, as well as
differential incentives for under-represented groups, and changes to the framing of survey re-
quests. We encourage on-line pollsters to experiment with these and other methods to increase
the diversity of their respondent pools.
The second strategy that pollsters can pursue to improve sample representativeness is to
modify the variables that are used for the weighting of the poll data. Here, there is not such
a clear trade-off between expense and quality as there is with obtaining more representative
samples. If variables that are correlated with self-selecting into opinion polls and vote intention
were readily available, pollsters would already be using them.We also recommend caution in the
use of variables for calibration weighting which do not have well-deﬁned and correctly known
population totals.
Despite its limitations, polling remains the primary means of estimating likely vote shares in
elections and this, we contend, is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Although polls
rarely produce exactly correct vote share estimates and sometimes produce substantial errors,
the historical record shows that the ﬁnal polls are usually within a few percentage points of
the actual party shares in elections (Sturgis et al., 2016). Yet, it must be better acknowledged
that accurately predicting vote shares in an election is a very challenging task (Hillygus, 2011).
A representative sample of the general population must be obtained and accurate reports of
party choice elicited from respondents. An approximately accurate method of determining how
likely respondents are to cast a vote must be implemented and the sample of voters must not
change their minds between taking part in the poll and casting their ballots. What is more, the
entire procedure must usually be carried out and reported on within a very short space of time
and at very low cost. Given these many potential pitfalls, it should come as no surprise that
the historical record shows polling errors of the approximate magnitude of 2015 occur at not
infrequent intervals.
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